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APPROPRIATION RIDERS. One of the most 
controvers ial and freque ntly used devices ofappropri-
ations-based policy-making is th e rider. Appropria-
tion ride rs, which a re amendments tacked onto an 
appropriation bill , take one of two forms. Legislative 
ride rs are nongermane a mendments that change ex-
istin g law, impose additional duties on government, or 
require judgme nts a nd dete rminations not otherwise 
required by law. Congressiolla l rules prohibit such 
ride rs in o rder to keep authorizations separate and 
apart from appropriations. Limitation riders , in con-
trast, are pres umptively germane ame ndm ents 1.0 a ll 
appropriations bill that specifica ll y prohibit th e use 01' 
fund s for des ignated activities. 
The History of Riders. Congress's use of and pres-
idential opposition to appropriatioll ride rs dates back 
to the 183 05. I nd eed , by 1837, d elays ill the e nactme nt 
or a ppropriation bills ca used by the atl.achlllent 0 1' 
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legislative riders led the House to adopt a rule prohib-
iting the appropriation "for any expenditure not pre-
viously authorized by law." Legislative riders were still 
enacted, however. In 1879, President Rutherford B. 
Hayes attacked such riders as improperly interfering 
with EXECUTIVE PREROGA·rlVE. Through a series of veto 
messages, Hayes claimed that Congress effectively 
negated the President's veto power by attaching 
nongermane riders to appropriations. In language 
strikingly similar to both late twentieth-century attacks 
on continuing resolutions and justifications for the 
ITEM VETO, Hayes argued that the "executive will no 
longer be what the framers of the Constitution in-
tended" because Congress's attachment of nonger-
mane riders to necessary appropriation measures 
made it impossible for the President to use the veto 
power without "stopping all of the operations of the 
Government." 
The Constitution does not distinguish between Con-
gress's power to appropriate funds and its other law-
making powers. The Constitution, moreover, does not 
demand that all provisions in a bill be pertinent to the 
bill's purpose. Legislative riders therefore are not 
constitutionally foreclosed. House and Senate rules, 
however, prohibit such riders. Limitation riders, 
which are not affected by these rules, have also had an 
enormous impact and remain extremely controversial. 
Military activities in Southeast Asia, public funding of 
ABORTION, air bags for automobiles, tax-exemptions 
for discriminatory schools, religious activities in the 
public schools, and public funding of school desegre-
gation are but some of the areas affected by limitation 
riders. 
Congress has been attaching limitation riders to 
appropriation bills since the 1870s. Nineteenth-cen-
tury riders involved WAR POWERS, federal supervision of 
elections, and extensions of the Constitution and rev-
enue laws to territories. By the I 970s, limitation riders 
became one of Congress's principal policy-making 
tools. From 1971 to 1977, 225 limitation amendments 
(31 percent of all amendments) were offered to appro-
priations bills. By 1980, limitation riders accounted for 
over 40 percent of all amendments. These riders, 
moreover, frequently addressed volatile policy dis-
putes. Fiscal year 1980 riders, for example, included 
restrictions on nondiscrimination enforcement by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Department of 
Education, and the Department of Justice; Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) en-
forcement of safety standards in small businesses; 
Department of Housing and Urban Development fi-
nancial assistance to student aliens; the distribution of 
government publications to CUBA, Iran, and the Soviet 
Union; and possible Department of Education efforts 
to prevent voluntary prayer in the public schools. 
Limitation riders have also proved critically impor-
tant during the Reagan and Bush presidencies. The 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, for example, centered on the re-
fusal of Reagan administration officials to comply with 
a limitation rider prohibiting federal assistance to the 
contra rebels in Nicaragua. Other 1980s and 1990s 
riders affected abortion funding, Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) affirmative action guide-
lines, and communications between executive agencies 
and congressional oversight committees. 
Debate over Riders. The controversial nature of 
limitation riders is not simply an outgrowth of the 
controversial subjects addressed by such riders. Limi-
tation riders also affect congressional relations with 
both the courts and the executive. Critics of limitation 
riders, for example, claim that since most appropria-
tions are enacted every year, agencies frequently do 
not know whether to view limitation riders as perma-
nent changes or temporary measures. Also, courts do 
not know whether to view limitation riders as amend-
ments to the underlying authorization bill. For exam-
ple, does the annual reenactment (since 1977) of riders 
prohibiting Medicaid-supported abortions relieve the 
states of their abortion-related Medicaid cost-sharing 
responsibilities? 
Critics also argue that Congress disrupts the balance 
of powers by using limitation riders to micromanage 
executive agencies. Specifically, these critics point to 
limitation riders prohibiting funding of regulatory 
initiatives, proposed reexaminations of agency policy, 
agency supervision of contacts between agency em-
ployees and members and committees of Congress 
and their staff, and White House review of agency 
orders. In 1990, pointing to such measures, Bush 
administration Attorney General Dick Thornburgh 
attacked such riders as "clearly eroding the President's 
constitutional responsibility to supervise the affairs of 
the executive branch as he sees fit." Some critics have 
extended this attack to argue that Congress cannot use 
its appropriations powers to prevent the President 
from performing the duties and exercising the pre-
rogatives given him by Article II of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, since limitation riders are often at-
tached to omnibus funding bills, critics also argue that 
the President cannot effectively use the veto power to 
check legislative interference. 
Supporters of Congress's use oflimitation riders, in 
contrast, argue that appropriations-based restrictions 
on agency action may be the only realistic way to stop 
the executive from launching administrative initiatives 
that Congress disfavors. Claiming that the appropria-
tions clause empowers Congress to control the level of 
executive-branch enforcement or execution of the 
law, supporters of Congress's use of limitation riders 
also reject opponents' constitutional objections. In-
deed, for supporters, rather than a mechanism to 
oversee every detail of executive implementation , lim-
itation riders enable Congress to defend against exec-
utive intrusions into Congress's lawmaking powers. 
For example, in response to IRS efforts during the 
Carter administration to deny tax-exempt status 
to private schools with inadequate minority enroll-
ments, Congress enacted limitation riders as a stopgap 
measure to allow the appropriate legislative commit-
tees a chance to evaluate the proposal. Similarly, after 
the FCC sought to reexamine its affirmative action 
guidelines during the Reagan administration, Con-
gress sought to check this "unwarranted" initiative 
through a limitation rider first enacted in 1987. That 
Congress used limitation riders to check both Carter 
and Reagan initiatives demonstrates that this device is 
neither liberal nor conservative, Republican nor Dem-
ocratic. 
Congress's use of limitation riders as a policy-mak-
ing device extends well beyond appropriations-based 
oversight of the executive. Another controversial use 
of limitation riders concerns elected government re-
sponses to Supreme Court decisions. Unlike constitu-
tional amendments and statutory challenges to Su-
preme Court decisions, funding restrictions do not 
seek to overturn Court decisions. Instead, elected gov-
ernment expresses its disagreement with the Court by 
refusing to appropriate funds that help effectuate 
Court rulings. For example, since fiscal year 1977, 
appropriations bills for the DEPARTMENT OF H EALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES (formerly Department of Health, Ed-
ucation, and Welfare) have contained language pro-
hibiting federal funding of abortion in almost all 
circumstances. These limitation riders have been sup-
ported, at various times and to varying degrees, by 
both the Congress and the White House. The Reagan 
and Bush administrations, for example, strongly 
backed these measures and vetoed appropriations bills 
that attempted to liberalize abortion funding. 
The debate over the propriety of riders is likely to 
continue. Congress has strong incentive to use this 
power. Appropriation riders are easier to enact than 
substantive legislation. Riders too are an effective 
mechanism to check both the executive and the Su-
preme Court. That the benefits of Congress's use of 
appropriation riders may strain the policy-making 
process does not matter. Congress is unlikely to aban-
don a policy tool that is as convenient as it is potent. 
Presidents too are unlikely to abandon appropriation 
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riders as a mechanism to keep in check court rulings 
and government programs that they disfavor. 
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